This study addresses the persistence of online romance fraud in Ghana and treats offenders as strategic players within a game-theoretic framework. By viewing fraudulent encounters as a strategic contest, the researchers explore how scammers decide when and how to target victims and sustain deception. Data were gathered through multiple qualitative channels, including semi-structured interviews, informal conversations, telephone conversations, and WhatsApp discussions, to capture the decision-making processes and interaction patterns. The analysis integrates concepts from game theory—specifically the Nash equilibrium and the role of asymmetric information—to illuminate how offenders’ rational calculations interact with information asymmetries to shape the fraud process. The approach seeks to map the sequence of moves, incentives, and information disclosures that characterise online romance scams, as well as the conditions under which victims remain susceptible. The findings indicate that when an offender makes a substantial initial investment and a victim places high trust in the relationship, the interaction can settle into an equilibrium that advantages the offender. In such a configuration, fraudulent activity