Internet romance fraud (IRF) is presented as an international crime with far-reaching consequences for individuals, organizations, and national systems. It arises from a online romantic relationship between a victim who develops affection and an offender who pursues criminal aims. Offenders recruit victims through dating platforms with the intention to deceive and defraud. The study gathered data from 320 respondents located in established IRF hotspot locations, which encompassed internet cafés and university campuses in Ghana. Analytical work employed Structural Equation Modeling with Partial Least Squares to map and test the causal links among the study variables, offering a structured view of how intentions and actions relate in this context. The results indicate that deterrence mechanisms related to punishment, specifically its certainty and severity, along with the corresponding dimensions of shame, can reduce the likelihood that individuals intend to commit IRF. Yet, there is a direct positive link observed between the intention to commit IRF and the actual occurrence of IRF acts. Among the deterrence factors, the punishment-related dimensions show a statistically significant negative impact, while the shame-related dimensions are negative but not statistically significant. This pattern suggests that offenders may not be deterred by shame in their pursuit of fraudulent acts, despite recognizing the criminal and punishable nature of their behavior. The research characterizes this stance as an emboldened attitude among IRF actors, one that appears resistant to conventional deterrents such as punishment or social stigma. From a policy and enforcement perspective, the findings emphasize that the criminal intention held by offenders tends to culminate in victims being defrauded under the veneer of a romantic relationship. This dynamic highlights the need for law enforcement and prosecution strategies to consider deterrence gaps identified in the study. The observed effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent is not necessarily sufficient to curb IRF activity, and there is an implicit suggestion that current penalties might send signals that fail to dissuade younger individuals from engaging in IRF. Overall, the study contributes to understanding how deterrence and perceived shame relate to IRF behavior and provides considerations for counter-fraud measures in this domain