Unravelling the organisation of ivorian cyberfraudsters: Criminal networks or organised crime?

Cretu-Adatte, Cristina ; Azi, Josselin Wilfred ; Beaudet-Labrecque, Olivier ; Bunning, Hazel ; Brunoni, Luca ; Zbinden, Renaud (2024) — Journal of Economic Criminology

Synopsis (AI-Generated)

This qualitative study used 18 approximately hour-long interviews with active Ivorian cyberfraudsters in Abidjan, including 10 people detained in prison and eight active but not detained. Thematic analysis distinguished relatively fluid, opportunistic sextortion groups from more hierarchical romance-scam groups with defined roles and involvement in other serious offenses. Both forms used international connections such as accomplices, money mules, underground bankers, or corrupt officials; young women could provide photographs, voices, and conversational assistance for false female profiles. The findings complicate the idea that all offenders belong to one organizational type. A small purposive sample, written notes instead of recordings, difficult access, sensitive settings, and possible nondisclosure make the organizational account preliminary.

Identified Gaps (AI-Generated)

The organisation of Ivorian brouteurs involved in romance scams and sextortion has lacked in-depth research. Prior work did not determine participants' roles, activities, or group organisational dynamics. The links between corruption, money laundering, and cybercrime require further investigation. The study also identifies limited knowledge of financial flows, disruption mechanisms, and the needs and capabilities of Ivorian institutions for international cooperation.

Methods (AI-Generated)

The researchers conducted 18 approximately hour-long semi-structured interviews in Abidjan during a two-month field project: ten participants were detained at MACA prison and eight were non-detained but active in cyberfraud. Participants were recruited through a key informant using snowball and purposive sampling. Written notes, rather than recordings, were thematically analysed. Interviews addressed backgrounds, scam methods, fake profiles, target selection, money, collaborators, roles, and networks.

Limitations (AI-Generated)

Access and trust were difficult because cybercriminals operated secretly; early fieldwork required an observational and cautious approach. The small interview sample cannot support definitive conclusions about a poorly understood phenomenon. Sensitive questions and interview locations may have caused reluctance, incomplete disclosure, or withdrawal. No audio or video recordings were made. The team also faced security risks, although a local resource person reduced exposure.

Future Work (AI-Generated)

Develop crime scripts and combine methods to describe scam processes and identify vulnerabilities. Interview more operational agents and other network actors, including underground bankers and IT specialists. Examine member demographics and criminal careers, network origins, growth, structure, and typologies. Investigate financial flows, money-laundering actors, disruption mechanisms, and Ivorian institutions' practical needs for cooperation and enforcement.

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