The Gamification of Online Romance Fraud through Offenders’ Cards
Abubakari, Yushawu ; Oseh-Ovarah, Valeen (2025) — Digital Threats: Research and Practice
DOI:
10.1145/3773289
Type:
Journal Article
Country:
Czech Republic
Synopsis (AI-Generated)
This qualitative offender study was conducted in Tamale, Ghana. Researchers recruited 15 self-identified "game boys" through three network leaders' endorsements, referral access, and prolonged methodological grooming. Data came from year-long fieldwork using informal conversations and semi-structured face-to-face, telephone, and WhatsApp interviews, conducted in Dagbani, English, and Pidgin English and translated into English. A high-investment offender interacting with a trusting, low-awareness victim produces an equilibrium favoring prolonged deception and maximum financial or emotional exploitation. Offenders collect information about victims to tailor communication and exploit emotional, social, and psychological vulnerabilities. The evidence is based on a small, localized sample of 15 male-identified "game boys" in Tamale, recruited through existing relationships and network leaders; results may not represent female offenders, other Ghanaian settings, victims, or other jurisdictions.
Identified Gaps (AI-Generated)
The paper identifies limited direct empirical study of how romance-fraud offenders conceptualize and narrate scams as a “game,” despite broader work on offender motivations, representations, and tactics. It also identifies rare use of game theory for romance fraud, limited attention to strategic interactions among fraudsters, victims, and law enforcement, and little research on competition among collaborating offenders. It notes scarcity of victim-centered research in the Global South.
Methods (AI-Generated)
Qualitative offender study in Tamale, Ghana. Researchers recruited 15 self-identified “game boys” through three network leaders’ endorsements, referral access, and prolonged methodological grooming. Data came from year-long fieldwork using informal conversations and semi-structured face-to-face, telephone, and WhatsApp interviews, conducted in Dagbani, English, and Pidgin English and translated into English. Transcripts and fieldnotes underwent iterative thematic, interpretive game-theoretic analysis using Nash equilibrium and asymmetric-information concepts, supplemented by decision trees, offender probability estimates, and payoff calculations.
Limitations (AI-Generated)
The evidence is based on a small, localized sample of 15 male-identified “game boys” in Tamale, recruited through existing relationships and network leaders; results may not represent female offenders, other Ghanaian settings, victims, or other jurisdictions. Several interviews were unrecorded and reconstructed from detailed notes. Quantitative-looking probability and expected-value estimates are based on offenders’ self-reports, with grooming estimates drawn from only three leaders, and the authors note these may vary by process and offender.
Future Work (AI-Generated)
Test and refine game-theoretic models of romance fraud across offenders, victims, platforms, and law enforcement, including offender competition. Evaluate whether automated identical-image flagging, public awareness/digital-literacy efforts, and symmetric-information practices disrupt fraud equilibria and reduce deception opportunities.
AI-Generated Content Notice
The synopsis and research notes on this page were generated with AI from available publication information and, when available, the uploaded paper text. They may contain errors, omissions, or interpretation issues. Readers should follow the DOI or source link, review the original publication, and make their own judgment about the content.
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