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Open Access: The Use of Military Profiles in Romance Fraud Schemes

Cross, C. ; Holt, TJ. (2022) — The New Technology of Financial Crime

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Synopsis

The study used mixed methods to analyze de-identified Scamwatch romance-fraud reports supplied by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, lodged July 2018-July 2019. After removing 204 duplicates, 3,259 reports remained; listwise quantitative analyses used 2,478 reports, including 375 military-narrative cases. Military narratives exploited trust and positive attributes associated with military personnel while targeting victims' love and compassion. The study found few consistent predictors of losing money in military-narrative romance fraud. Scamwatch self-reports have no screening or human interaction, limiting generalizability and potentially not reflecting all romance-fraud victims.

Identified Gaps

Before this study, no empirical research had specifically examined military profiles/narratives in romance fraud or whether military narratives had distinct characteristics relative to established romance-fraud and advance-fee-fraud schemes. The findings also indicate limited ability to identify consistent predictors of financial loss within military-narrative cases, leaving prevention targeting challenging.

Methods

Mixed-methods analysis of de-identified Scamwatch romance-fraud reports supplied by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, lodged July 2018–July 2019. After removing 204 duplicates, 3,259 reports remained; listwise quantitative analyses used 2,478 reports, including 375 military-narrative cases. Logistic regressions tested correlates of military narratives and reported financial loss. Researchers also thematically analysed 463 free-text military-narrative reports in NVivo 12, coding reasons for money requests and identifying narrative themes.

Limitations

Scamwatch self-reports have no screening or human interaction, limiting generalizability and potentially not reflecting all romance-fraud victims. The online portal may receive reports from people directed by police, banks, or searches. Missing demographic/narrative data required listwise deletion in quantitative analysis. Financial loss and vulnerability indicators were self-reported, not fully verified, and terms such as bank/personal details were not defined for respondents. Free-text quality varied, so absence of a theme does not show it was absent from an experience.

Future Work

Evaluate and improve continuous prevention messaging, especially messages discouraging responses to first contact and sending money after online requests. Develop and assess technological detection, quarantine, filtering, or deletion of suspicious social-media profiles and private messages. Further research should promote and examine offender techniques and emotional targeting on relationship-facilitating platforms.

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