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Evidence explained

How scammers turn closeness into financial pressure

Scammers can make sending money feel like caring for a partner or building a future together. Grooming means developing closeness that can later be exploited for money. Studies describe this process, but limited direct investigation leaves uncertainty about which tactics lead people to agree to requests or send money (Feng, 2026; Gould et al., 2021; Whitty, 2013).

AI-assisted explanation · Automated editorial and source checks. Preparation and review details

Four ways trust becomes leverage

The evidence concerns more than false profiles or suspicious payment requests. It shows how communication can change what a request means to the person receiving it. The findings below describe different parts of that process, not a fixed sequence that every scam follows (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Carter, 2020; Kim & Seo, 2019).

Four ways trust becomes leverage
FocusWhat the studies showWhat remains uncertain
Personal attention Linguistic analysis of victim conversations

Scammers used expressions of care, attraction, shared values, and a shared future to present themselves as attentive and trustworthy partners (Shaari et al., 2019).

Interpretation. Because the detailed analysis included only people who paid, it cannot establish whether the observed language distinguishes people who paid from those who resisted, or whether that language caused payment (Shaari et al., 2019).

Secrecy and obligation Analysis of fraudulent correspondence

One fraudster portrayed family discussions as betrayal and his declining health as a reason the victim should continue helping (Carter, 2020).

Interpretation. The analysis reveals pressure within this exchange; it does not establish how often these tactics occur across romance fraud (Carter, 2020).

Investment reassurance Cryptocurrency fraud case study

In one case, a refund after a supposedly unsuccessful trade appeared to build trust before subsequent trades displayed large gains (Botha et al., 2025).

Interpretation. The interpretation draws on discussions with the victim; it does not isolate the refund’s influence from the relationship already established (Botha et al., 2025).

Attachment after discovery Research on victims’ experiences

People may retain belief in the relationship after learning of the deception, allowing the fraud to continue or restart (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013).

Interpretation. This finding describes a possible response to discovery, not an inevitable reaction or an estimate of how often renewed fraud happens (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013).

The relationship changes the meaning of money

A systematic review describes offenders avoiding overt financial demands that might alarm a target. In research involving people with acquired brain injury, money requests were presented as a way to make the future relationship possible—not as an unrelated transaction (Gould et al., 2021; Kassem & Carter, 2023).

There is no single timetable. Whitty’s 2013 research described declarations of love and requests to move to email or instant messaging within one to two weeks. Kim and Seo’s 2019 account described relationships lasting from a week to more than a year before financial problems were raised. A slower approach does not contradict the pattern (Kim & Seo, 2019; Whitty, 2013).

Requests can also grow gradually. Buchanan and Whitty described small gifts, such as a phone or webcam, being requested before larger sums. The sequence matters: a major payment may follow earlier acts of apparent care rather than arrive as an isolated, obviously different demand (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013).

Personalized attention can feel like being understood

Shaari and colleagues’ 2019 study of online romance scams in Malaysia selected 30 sets of conversations from 30 victims for detailed linguistic analysis. Each selected victim had experienced all the scam stages identified by the researchers and had made at least one payment. The analysis examined how familiar names and places made an apparent stranger seem more connected to the victim (Shaari et al., 2019).

In these conversations, claims of honesty, religious expressions, and affection were paired with assurances that the victim or their future together came first. The analysis shows how familiar relationship language appeared within the selected scams (Shaari et al., 2019).

Personal disclosure can deepen the imbalance. Participants in Whitty’s research recalled sharing exceptionally intimate life details and later recognizing that the offender had disclosed less. An account of organized scam operations also describes recording targets’ family, business, and relationship problems so that apparent support could be tailored to them (Franceschini et al., 2023; Whitty, 2013).

Affection can become pressure to stay silent

In Carter’s analysis of a romance fraud, the offender cast discussions with the victim’s children as something that damaged his mental health and disgraced him. His apparent vulnerability placed responsibility on her. Elsewhere in the exchange, claims of declining health made continued assistance seem necessary and withdrawal difficult (Carter, 2020).

Other research describes both positive and negative emotions being used to obtain money, including temporarily withdrawing communication. Moving to private channels and establishing secrecy also appear together as ways of creating isolation. The concern is therefore not simply that messages become private, but that the relationship increasingly discourages outside discussion (Cross et al., 2018).

A supposed partner can become an investment guide

A 2025 case study by Botha and colleagues followed a romance scam that became cryptocurrency investment fraud. After a week on Tinder, the two people exchanged numbers and moved to WhatsApp, where communication continued for another three weeks (Botha et al., 2025).

According to discussions with the victim, the platform refunded a trade after claiming the market had moved against it. The researchers interpreted this as trust-building; later trades appeared to nearly double the invested amount. These were events inside a fraudulent platform, not evidence of genuine investment performance or a measured effect of the refund alone (Botha et al., 2025).

The relationship-to-investment route appears beyond that single case. Anderson and colleagues found that 84 of 200 collected online investment fraud cases began with an online relationship. That proportion describes their case collection, not all investment fraud, and the available case information does not establish that every initial relationship was romantic (Anderson et al., 2024).

What researchers have examined—and what remains uncertain

Feng’s 2026 review mapped existing research, including 87 publications found through seven academic databases and four databases covering material outside scholarly journals. Few publications explicitly used the concept of grooming or directly studied it. This does not mean offenders rarely groom targets: descriptions of scams are not the same as tests of how particular exchanges change trust or payment decisions (Feng, 2026).

A 2023 systematic review found few studies that examined exchanges between scammers and victims on messaging platforms. Researchers using experiments also caution that their studies cannot fully recreate relationships that develop over time. Studying a response in an experiment does not show how someone would respond after prolonged contact, growing attachment, and pressure from a supposed partner (Bilz et al., 2023; Huang & Yao, 2025).

Interpretation. Researchers call for studying ongoing scammer–victim exchanges to understand trust and changing tactics. A useful next step would be to collect, with participants’ consent and ethical protections, records checked for authenticity, ordered by time, and linked to verified payment outcomes. This could establish which tactics preceded financial decisions, rather than merely which words appeared in scams; that sequence alone would not prove causation (Huang & Yao, 2025; Lee et al., 2022).

What education and support teams can change

Interpretation. These findings support changes in what teams explain and ask about. They do not establish that a particular lesson or response prevents losses. The practical aim is to account for the relationship surrounding a request, rather than treating the payment as a decision made without that history (Carter, 2024).

  1. Teach the transition, not a list of romantic words

    Explain when a request is linked to the couple’s imagined future and when contact shifts toward an investment. Focus the lesson on that transition, instead of treating affectionate or religious language as proof of fraud (Botha et al., 2025; Gould et al., 2021; Shaari et al., 2019).

  2. Ask what makes refusal difficult

    When reviewing a suspected case, make room for questions about secrecy, responsibility for the other person’s distress, and what happens when help is refused. These questions follow the documented pressure tactics without assuming that the person simply overlooked an obvious money request (Carter, 2020; Cross et al., 2018).

  3. Why discovery may not end attachment

    Research describes losing the perceived relationship alongside the money, and attachment may persist after deception is revealed. Support planning should therefore distinguish recognizing the fraud, ending continued exploitation, and coping with relationship loss. Do not assume that accepting evidence resolves the attachment. These findings explain why support needs can differ; they do not identify a tested recovery service (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross et al., 2016).

Does the response address the relationship behind the request?

Before adopting a lesson or response protocol, ask whether it explains why a payment could feel like care, loyalty, or a shared opportunity. Decide what change you would look for in real conversations and payment decisions to judge whether the response helps (Gould et al., 2021; Huang & Yao, 2025).

About the evidence

This explanation draws on selected sources from RSRC’s full synthesis. The full research record, its source list and version history remain available below.

Scope, preparation and limitations

AI prepared this explanation from synthesis version 108, then performed separate editorial grading and source-support checks. The automated grades assess communication; they are not reader-test results or measures of scientific certainty. No human or expert content review of this explanation is recorded.

The full synthesis preserves 40 publication records and 151 evidence statements. These counts do not establish the number of independent studies or the strength of a finding. Practical implications are editorial interpretations, with limitations explained alongside the evidence.

RSRC methodology
Sources cited in this explanation (17)

Links open the publication record or original work. Journal access may vary.

  1. Anderson, M., March, E., Land, L., & Boshuijzen-van Burken, C. (2024). Exploring the roles played by trust and technology in the online investment fraud victimisation process. Journal of Criminology, 57(4), 488–514. https://doi.org/10.1177/26338076241248176
  2. Bilz, A., Shepherd, L. A., & Johnson, G. I. (2023). Tainted Love: a Systematic Literature Review of Online Romance Scam Research. Interacting with Computers, 35(6), 773–788. https://doi.org/10.1093/iwc/iwad048
  3. Botha, J. G., Singh, K., & Leenen, L. (2025). Analysis of a Cryptocurrency Investment Scam: Pig Butchering. European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, 24(1). https://doi.org/10.34190/eccws.24.1.3558
  4. Buchanan, T., & Whitty, M. T. (2013). The online dating romance scam: causes and consequences of victimhood. Psychology, Crime & Law, 20(3), 261–283. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316x.2013.772180
  5. Carter, E. (2020). Distort, Extort, Deceive and Exploit: Exploring the Inner Workings of a Romance Fraud. The British Journal of Criminology, 61(2), 283–302. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azaa072
  6. Carter, E. (2024). The Language of Romance Crimes. The Language of Romance Crimes. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009273008
  7. Cross, C., Dragiewicz, M., & Richards, K. (2018). Understanding Romance Fraud: Insights From Domestic Violence Research. The British Journal of Criminology, 58(6), 1303–1322. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azy005
  8. Cross, C., Richards, K., & Smith, R. (2016). The reporting experiences and support needs of victims of online fraud. Australian Institute of Criminology eBooks. https://doi.org/10.52922/ti148355
  9. Feng, M. (2026). Grooming in online dating romance frauds and scams: A scoping review. Journal of Economic Criminology, 13, 100231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2026.100231
  10. Franceschini, I., Li, L., & Bo, M. (2023). Compound Capitalism: A Political Economy of Southeast Asia’s Online Scam Operations. Critical Asian Studies, 55(4), 575–603. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2023.2268104
  11. Gould, K. R., Carminati, J.-Y. J., & Ponsford, J. L. (2021). “They just say how stupid I was for being conned”. Cyberscams and acquired brain injury: A qualitative exploration of the lived experience of survivors and close others. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 33(2), 325–345. https://doi.org/10.1080/09602011.2021.2016447
  12. Huang, Y., & Yao, R. (2025). The Imperfect ‘Perfect’ Fraudster: Exploring How Vulnerability Framing, Fraudster Identity, and Victim Attachment Shape Financial Risk Perception. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-025-09638-9
  13. Kassem, R., & Carter, E. (2023). Mapping romance fraud research – a systematic review. Journal of Financial Crime, 31(4), 974–992. https://doi.org/10.1108/jfc-06-2023-0160
  14. Kim, H.-S., & Seo, J.-B. (2019). A Study on Romance Scam : The Current Situation and Effective Countermeasures. The Police Science Journal, 14(3), 117–146. https://doi.org/10.16961/polips.2019.14.3.117
  15. Lee, K. F., Chan, M. Y., & Mohamad Ali, A. (2022). Self and desired partner descriptions in the online romance scam: a linguistic analysis of scammer and general user profiles on online dating portals. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 25(1), 20–46. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41300-022-00169-7
  16. Shaari, A. H., Kamaluddin, M. R., Paizi@Fauzi, W. F., & Mohd, M. (2019). Online-Dating Romance Scam in Malaysia: An Analysis of Online Conversations between Scammers and Victims. GEMA Online® Journal of Language Studies, 19(1), 97–115. https://doi.org/10.17576/gema-2019-1901-06
  17. Whitty, M. T. (2013). Anatomy of the online dating romance scam. Security Journal, 28(4), 443–455. https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2012.57
Full synthesis and revision history

Download the full synthesis PDF

Across the reviewed evidence, relationship‑based frauds commonly use deliberate, interactional grooming to generate interpersonal trust that is later leveraged for financial or other exploitation. Descriptive sources converge on a staged interactional pattern—initial approach on public platforms, rapid or sustained intimacy work, migration to private channels, and subsequently framed monetary or investment requests. Trust is built through frequent, tailored, emotionally attuned communication (including mirroring, personalized references, repeated affirmations of commitment, and sympathy narratives) that elicits reciprocal self‑disclosure and perceived closeness; these interactional tactics are reported in both individualized catfishing and organized pig‑butchering variants. Empirical work documents temporal heterogeneity (from days to many months or longer before the first financial request) and recurring escalation sequences in which small test requests precede larger solicitations. Victims report combined financial and emotional harms—loss of the perceived relationship, diminished trust in others, and difficulty accepting deception. Methodological syntheses and primary studies explicitly identify a shortage of authenticated, time‑sequenced interactional corpora linking discrete conversational moves to verified financial outcomes and recommend ethically governed interactional datasets, offender–victim triangulation, and validation against real conversations. Experimental or synthetic approaches are used to test specific mechanisms but authors caution these methods cannot reproduce prolonged, adaptive grooming interactions; they recommend longitudinal, ethnographic, or mixed‑method designs where feasible (Annadorai et al., 2020; Ashibly, 2025; Bilz et al., 2023; Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Carter, 2024; Cross, 2023; Griffin & Mei, 2024; Gujarathi et al., 2026; Huang & Yao, 2025; Kim & Seo, 2019; K. F. Lee et al., 2022; Ranaweera & Neiat, 2026; “The Crime of "Pig-butchering Scams" in the Securities Market and...”, 2023; Whitty, 2013).

Typical interactional sequence and temporal variability

Multiple descriptive studies and reviews describe a recurring multi‑stage sequence in relationship‑based fraud: offenders approach targets on public platforms (dating sites, social media, random messages), develop rapport and intimacy (often with early declarations of affection), move conversations into private channels (instant messaging, email, phone), and then introduce framed monetary requests that escalate from small, plausible asks to larger solicitations (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; H. Lee & Boo, 2025; Lim & Choi, 2025; Whitty, 2013).

The interval between first contact and the initial financial request varies substantially across reports. Some cases escalate within days or weeks, while investment‑oriented hybrids (often labelled pig‑butchering) commonly involve weeks to many months of sustained grooming before financial extraction, so the literature emphasizes temporal heterogeneity rather than a single typical timeline (Ashibly, 2025; Griffin & Mei, 2024; Gujarathi et al., 2026; Kim & Seo, 2019; “The Crime of "Pig-butchering Scams" in the Securities Market and...”, 2023).

Interactional mechanics: how trust is constructed

Authors report that trust is constructed through high‑volume, often daily, tailored communication that elicits reciprocal self‑disclosure and produces perceived closeness. Techniques documented include mirroring and personalization (using victim‑provided details), love‑bombing (frequent praise, declarations of commitment, projected shared futures), and use of sympathy narratives (medical, legal, or logistical crises) to create urgency and moral obligation to help (Annadorai et al., 2020; Carter, 2020; Cross, 2023; Grace Carvalho Fernandes et al., 2023; Yosiandra & Sakariah, 2024).

Linguistic and discourse analyses show repeated micro‑ and macro‑linguistic devices used to sustain an illusion of authenticity: pet names, flattering or poetic expressions, future‑oriented modal language, appeals to bonding or shared values, and tailored self‑presentation that exploits victim disclosures. Asynchronous messaging permits offenders time to craft hyperpersonal content and to adapt presentation in response to victims’ input (Annadorai et al., 2020; Dreijers & Rudziša, 2020; Shaari et al., 2019).

Secrecy and migration to private channels are frequently documented operational tactics. Moving conversations off the originating platform increases exclusivity and, in victim hindsight, was recognized as a strategy to reduce reporting and detection; offenders also withhold or withdraw communication strategically to increase anxiety and compliance (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross et al., 2018; Kassem & Carter, 2023).

Variants and organizational forms

Empirical and forensic work distinguishes individualized catfishing—single actors using fabricated profiles—from organized, worker‑mediated operations that train personnel to sustain long‑running grooming. Ethnographic and qualitative accounts document recruitment, intensive training, and role specialization in some organized pig‑butchering operations (Anderson et al., 2024; Franceschini et al., 2023; Luo & Zhao, 2025).

Pig‑butchering (romance‑to‑investment) scams are characterized by prolonged, relationship‑like digital contact in which offenders deliberately build trust and elicit compliance before requesting money. Descriptions of operational stages commonly identify (1) approach using a false identity on digital platforms, (2) sustained trust‑building through daily messages and simulated emotional reciprocity, and (3) financial extraction via investment solicitations. Case analyses include examples in which a romantic connection on a dating app later escalated into a cryptocurrency investment solicitation. In securities‑market variants, these schemes often take about six months as fraudsters construct identities and apparent professional capability to gain victims’ trust (Ashibly, 2025; Botha et al., 2025; Cross & Holt, 2025; Gujarathi et al., 2026; “The Crime of "Pig-butchering Scams" in the Securities Market and...”, 2023).

Organized operations use scripted persona techniques to build trust and rapport: scammers share fabricated photos, videos, and life stories and display care (sometimes sending expensive gifts) to develop intimate relationships, after which they recommend fake investments and steal the target’s funds (Cross, 2022; Franceschini et al., 2023; Wang & Zhou, 2022).

Victim experience, harms, and vulnerability patterns

Victim accounts and complaint‑dataset analyses consistently show that many victims form strong emotional attachments to the presented persona and that this emotional investment compounds harm: victims report both monetary loss and relational loss (grief, loss of perceived relationship), and prolonged intense offender contact can erode trust in online environments and others (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross, Richards, & Smith, 2016; Notté et al., 2021).

Victims may continue to comply after initial transfers: documented patterns show an escalation path where small, plausible requests (help with travel, gifts, phone credit) are followed by larger, repeated demands or investment solicitations, especially when offenders provide apparent early returns or staged proofs of legitimacy (Button et al., 2014; Kim & Seo, 2019; Luong & Ngo, 2024; “The Crime of "Pig-butchering Scams" in the Securities Market and...”, 2023; Wang & Zhou, 2022).

Specific vulnerability indicators recur in the literature—loneliness, social isolation, and acquired brain injury are frequently reported in case and qualitative work as associated with targeting or larger harms—but these findings are descriptive or correlational and derive from purposive, complaint‑based, or clinical samples; causal inferences about susceptibility are not established in those records (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross, 2016; Gould et al., 2021).

Methodological patterns, limitations, and evidence gaps

The reviewed corpus is rich in qualitative descriptions, case studies, targeted chat corpora, and systematic reviews, but many primary studies use purposive, complaint‑based, or small samples and are retrospective or platform‑bounded. These designs support robust descriptive inferences about grooming tactics and language but limit representativeness and causal attribution (Cross & Holt, 2025; Feng, 2026; Shaari et al., 2019; Whitty, 2013).

A recurring, explicitly identified gap is the scarcity of authenticated, time‑sequenced collections that link discrete conversational moves to verified financial outcomes. Several syntheses and primary studies call for ethically governed interactional datasets, offender–victim triangulation, and validation of detection features against real conversations rather than synthetic benchmarks alone (Bilz et al., 2023; Huang & Yao, 2025; K. F. Lee et al., 2022; Ranaweera & Neiat, 2026).

Experimental and synthetic approaches are useful for testing specific mechanisms but have limits: authors caution that short vignettes or generated dialogues cannot reproduce the prolonged, adaptive interactions in which grooming and escalation occur, and recommend longitudinal, ethnographic, or mixed‑method designs where ethically feasible (Carter, 2024; Huang & Yao, 2025; Ranaweera & Neiat, 2026).

Implications for research and practice

Where evidence supports concrete next steps, authors recommend collecting authenticated interaction‑level corpora—collected with ethical protections and victim consent—so researchers can test which conversational moves predict verified transfers and clarify temporal ordering in grooming and escalation (Bilz et al., 2023; K. F. Lee et al., 2022; “The Crime of "Pig-butchering Scams" in the Securities Market and...”, 2023).

Interactional evidence shows that romance-based grooming is relational—many victims reported feeling love or being in love with the catfish perpetrator—and uses social-engineering tactics such as warmth, flirtation, pet names, and questions about hobbies. This batch includes a linguistic analysis of thirty victim conversations and a narrative prototype (a game) whose core story depicts a romance scam in which the protagonist is progressively drawn deeper into the fraud (Lea et al., 2024; Ranaweera & Neiat, 2026; Ryan & Taylor, 2024; Shaari et al., 2019).

Romance fraud involves offenders exploiting relationships that victims perceive as genuine; offenders gain victims’ trust in order to manipulate them (Cross, 2019; Grace Carvalho Fernandes et al., 2023).

References

This AI-assisted synthesis is based on reviewed evidence records. It may contain errors or omissions. Follow the publication and DOI links, consult the original works, and make your own judgment about the evidence.

Revision history

  1. Version 108

    Current public version

    Automated claim-level support repair round 1, correcting 4 passages from synthesis version 107.

  2. Version 107

    Automated evidence-grounded revision attempt 1. Initial version.

    • Publications: 40 (-6)
    • Evidence statements: 151 (-11)
    • Cited sources: 40 (-6)

    Sources added: Analysis of a Cryptocurrency Investment Scam: Pig Butchering; “You’re not alone”: the use of peer support groups for fraud victims.

    Sources removed: (Mis)Understanding the Impact of Online Fraud: Implications for Victim Assistance Schemes; Developments in the Law Governing Online Activity: The Criminalisation of Catfishing and Civil Relief in Cases of Image-Based Sexual Abuse; Media Presentation of Online Romance Fraud in the Czech Republic: Visibility, Victim-Offender Framing, and Sentiment; Online Dating Scam Victims Psychological Impact Analysis; and 4 more.

  3. Version 106

    Initial version: this is the first synthesized, evidence‑linked rendering of the reviewed corpus for the controlled topic 'Grooming and Trust Development'. It consolidates cross‑study descriptive patterns, methodological limitations, and evidence‑supported future directions identified explicitly in the reviewed records; no prior-version changes applied.

    • Publications: 46 (+19)
    • Evidence statements: 162 (+43)
    • Cited sources: 46 (+19)

    Sources added: (Mis)Understanding the Impact of Online Fraud: Implications for Victim Assistance Schemes; Analyzing the Evolving Modus Operandi of Romance Scams via Court Judgments: Crime Script and Policy Implications; An exploration of the motivations of catfish perpetrators and the emotions and feelings expressed by catfish victims using automated linguistic analysis and thematic analysis; Butcher or be butchered: understanding the unwitting recruitment by cybercrime groups in China; and 24 more.

    Sources removed: Analysis of a Cryptocurrency Investment Scam: Pig Butchering; Emotional and financial costs of online dating scam: A phenomenological narrative of the experiences of victims of Nigerian romance fraudsters; Language, Psychology, and New New Media: The Hyperpersonal Model of Mediated Communication at Twenty-Five Years; More than Money: Examining the Potential Exposure of Romance Fraud Victims to Identity Crime; and 5 more.

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