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Evidence explained

How scammers turn closeness into financial pressure

Scammers can make sending money feel like caring for a partner or building a future together. Grooming means developing closeness that can later be exploited for money. Studies describe this process, but limited direct investigation leaves uncertainty about which tactics lead people to agree to requests or send money (Feng, 2026; Gould et al., 2021; Whitty, 2013).

Explanation updated . This can reflect an editorial correction without a new evidence snapshot.

AI-assisted explanation · Automated editorial and source checks. Preparation and review details

Four ways trust becomes leverage

The evidence concerns more than false profiles or suspicious payment requests. It shows how communication can change what a request means to the person receiving it. The findings below describe different parts of that process, not a fixed sequence that every scam follows (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Carter, 2020; Kim & Seo, 2019).

Four ways trust becomes leverage
FocusWhat the studies showWhat remains uncertain
Personal attention Linguistic analysis of victim conversations

Scammers used expressions of care, attraction, shared values, and a shared future to present themselves as attentive and trustworthy partners (Shaari et al., 2019).

Interpretation. Because the detailed analysis included only people who paid, it cannot establish whether the observed language distinguishes people who paid from those who resisted, or whether that language caused payment (Shaari et al., 2019).

Secrecy and obligation Analysis of fraudulent correspondence

One fraudster portrayed family discussions as betrayal and his declining health as a reason the victim should continue helping (Carter, 2020).

Interpretation. The analysis reveals pressure within this exchange; it does not establish how often these tactics occur across romance fraud (Carter, 2020).

Investment reassurance Cryptocurrency fraud case study

In one case, a refund after a supposedly unsuccessful trade appeared to build trust before subsequent trades displayed large gains (Botha et al., 2025).

Interpretation. The interpretation draws on discussions with the victim; it does not isolate the refund’s influence from the relationship already established (Botha et al., 2025).

Attachment after discovery Research on victims’ experiences

People may retain belief in the relationship after learning of the deception, allowing the fraud to continue or restart (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013).

Interpretation. This finding describes a possible response to discovery, not an inevitable reaction or an estimate of how often renewed fraud happens (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013).

The relationship changes the meaning of money

A systematic review describes offenders avoiding overt financial demands that might alarm a target. In research involving people with acquired brain injury, money requests were presented as a way to make the future relationship possible—not as an unrelated transaction (Gould et al., 2021; Kassem & Carter, 2023).

There is no single timetable. Whitty’s 2013 research described declarations of love and requests to move to email or instant messaging within one to two weeks. Kim and Seo’s 2019 account described relationships lasting from a week to more than a year before financial problems were raised. A slower approach does not contradict the pattern (Kim & Seo, 2019; Whitty, 2013).

Requests can also grow gradually. Buchanan and Whitty described small gifts, such as a phone or webcam, being requested before larger sums. The sequence matters: a major payment may follow earlier acts of apparent care rather than arrive as an isolated, obviously different demand (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013).

Personalized attention can feel like being understood

Shaari and colleagues’ 2019 study of online romance scams in Malaysia selected 30 sets of conversations from 30 victims for detailed linguistic analysis. Each selected victim had experienced all the scam stages identified by the researchers and had made at least one payment. The analysis examined how familiar names and places made an apparent stranger seem more connected to the victim (Shaari et al., 2019).

In these conversations, claims of honesty, religious expressions, and affection were paired with assurances that the victim or their future together came first (Shaari et al., 2019).

Personal disclosure can deepen the imbalance. Participants in Whitty’s research recalled sharing exceptionally intimate life details and later recognizing that the offender had disclosed less. An account of organized scam operations also describes recording targets’ family, business, and relationship problems so that apparent support could be tailored to them (Franceschini et al., 2023; Whitty, 2013).

Affection can become pressure to stay silent

In Carter’s analysis of a romance fraud, the offender cast discussions with the victim’s children as something that damaged his mental health and disgraced him. His apparent vulnerability placed responsibility on her. Elsewhere in the exchange, claims of declining health made continued assistance seem necessary and withdrawal difficult (Carter, 2020).

Other research describes both positive and negative emotions being used to obtain money, including temporarily withdrawing communication. Moving to private channels and establishing secrecy also appear together as ways of creating isolation. The concern is therefore not simply that messages become private, but that the relationship increasingly discourages outside discussion (Cross et al., 2018).

A supposed partner can become an investment guide

A 2025 case study by Botha and colleagues followed a romance scam that became cryptocurrency investment fraud. After a week on Tinder, the two people exchanged numbers and moved to WhatsApp, where communication continued for another three weeks (Botha et al., 2025).

According to discussions with the victim, the platform refunded a trade after claiming the market had moved against it. The researchers interpreted this as trust-building; later trades appeared to nearly double the invested amount. These were events inside a fraudulent platform, not evidence of genuine investment performance or a measured effect of the refund alone (Botha et al., 2025).

The relationship-to-investment route appears beyond that single case. Anderson and colleagues found that 84 of 200 collected online investment fraud cases began with an online relationship. That proportion describes their case collection, not all investment fraud, and the available case information does not establish that every initial relationship was romantic (Anderson et al., 2024).

What researchers have examined—and what remains uncertain

Interpretation. Feng’s 2026 review included 87 publications. It found that the research literature rarely explicitly used or directly studied grooming. This is a finding about how researchers describe and investigate the process, not about how often offenders use it (Feng, 2026).

A 2023 systematic review found few studies that examined exchanges between scammers and victims on messaging platforms. Researchers using experiments also caution that their studies cannot fully recreate relationships that develop over time. Studying a response in an experiment does not show how someone would respond after prolonged contact, growing attachment, and pressure from a supposed partner (Bilz et al., 2023; Huang & Yao, 2025).

Interpretation. Researchers call for observing real, ongoing online conversations to understand how scammers gain trust and adjust their approach. That could involve following interactions as they develop. A separate research question concerns how people understand and handle in-person encounters that follow online contact. The call for that work does not establish how often those encounters occur or what happens in them (Huang & Yao, 2025; Lee et al., 2022; Verma et al., 2026).

What education and support teams can change

Interpretation. These findings support changes in what teams explain and ask about. They do not establish that a particular lesson or response prevents losses. The practical aim is to account for the relationship surrounding a request, rather than treating the payment as a decision made without that history (Carter, 2024).

  1. Teach the transition, not a list of romantic words

    Explain when a request is linked to the couple’s imagined future and when contact shifts toward an investment. Focus the lesson on that transition, instead of treating affectionate or religious language as proof of fraud (Botha et al., 2025; Gould et al., 2021; Shaari et al., 2019).

  2. Ask what makes refusal difficult

    When reviewing a suspected case, make room for questions about secrecy, responsibility for the other person’s distress, and what happens when help is refused. These questions follow the documented pressure tactics without assuming that the person simply overlooked an obvious money request (Carter, 2020; Cross et al., 2018).

  3. Why discovery may not end attachment

    Research describes losing the perceived relationship alongside the money, and attachment may persist after deception is revealed. Support planning should therefore distinguish recognizing the fraud, ending continued exploitation, and coping with relationship loss. Do not assume that accepting evidence resolves the attachment. These findings explain why support needs can differ; they do not identify a tested recovery service (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross et al., 2016).

Does the response address the relationship behind the request?

Before adopting a lesson or response protocol, ask whether it explains why a payment could feel like care, loyalty, or a shared opportunity. Decide what change you would look for in real conversations and payment decisions to judge whether the response helps (Gould et al., 2021; Huang & Yao, 2025).

About the evidence

This explanation draws on selected sources from RSRC’s full synthesis. The full research record, its source list and version history remain available below.

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Scope, preparation and limitations

Codex edited and reviewed this explanation from synthesis version 112. Changed passages were checked against preserved source excerpts; passing source checks were reused for unchanged passages. The editorial judgments are recorded as Codex review, not a new API grading run. They assess communication, not reader-test results or scientific certainty. No human or expert content review of this explanation is recorded.

The full synthesis preserves 41 publication records and 151 evidence statements. These counts do not establish the number of independent studies or the strength of a finding. Practical implications are editorial interpretations, with limitations explained alongside the evidence.

RSRC methodology
Sources cited in this explanation (18)

Links open the publication record or original work. Journal access may vary.

  1. Anderson, M., March, E., Land, L., & Boshuijzen-van Burken, C. (2024). Exploring the roles played by trust and technology in the online investment fraud victimisation process. Journal of Criminology, 57(4), 488–514. https://doi.org/10.1177/26338076241248176
  2. Bilz, A., Shepherd, L. A., & Johnson, G. I. (2023). Tainted Love: a Systematic Literature Review of Online Romance Scam Research. Interacting with Computers, 35(6), 773–788. https://doi.org/10.1093/iwc/iwad048
  3. Botha, J. G., Singh, K., & Leenen, L. (2025). Analysis of a Cryptocurrency Investment Scam: Pig Butchering. European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, 24(1), 61–70. https://doi.org/10.34190/eccws.24.1.3558
  4. Buchanan, T., & Whitty, M. T. (2013). The online dating romance scam: causes and consequences of victimhood. Psychology, Crime & Law, 20(3), 261–283. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316x.2013.772180
  5. Carter, E. (2020). Distort, Extort, Deceive and Exploit: Exploring the Inner Workings of a Romance Fraud. The British Journal of Criminology, 61(2), 283–302. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azaa072
  6. Carter, E. (2024). The Language of Romance Crimes. The Language of Romance Crimes. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009273008
  7. Cross, C., Dragiewicz, M., & Richards, K. (2018). Understanding Romance Fraud: Insights From Domestic Violence Research. The British Journal of Criminology, 58(6), 1303–1322. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azy005
  8. Cross, C., Richards, K., & Smith, R. (2016). The reporting experiences and support needs of victims of online fraud. Australian Institute of Criminology eBooks. https://doi.org/10.52922/ti148355
  9. Feng, M. (2026). Grooming in online dating romance frauds and scams: A scoping review. Journal of Economic Criminology, 13, 100231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2026.100231
  10. Franceschini, I., Li, L., & Bo, M. (2023). Compound Capitalism: A Political Economy of Southeast Asia’s Online Scam Operations. Critical Asian Studies, 55(4), 575–603. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2023.2268104
  11. Gould, K. R., Carminati, J.-Y. J., & Ponsford, J. L. (2021). “They just say how stupid I was for being conned”. Cyberscams and acquired brain injury: A qualitative exploration of the lived experience of survivors and close others. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 33(2), 325–345. https://doi.org/10.1080/09602011.2021.2016447
  12. Huang, Y., & Yao, R. (2025). The Imperfect ‘Perfect’ Fraudster: Exploring How Vulnerability Framing, Fraudster Identity, and Victim Attachment Shape Financial Risk Perception. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-025-09638-9
  13. Kassem, R., & Carter, E. (2023). Mapping romance fraud research – a systematic review. Journal of Financial Crime, 31(4), 974–992. https://doi.org/10.1108/jfc-06-2023-0160
  14. Kim, H.-S., & Seo, J.-B. (2019). 로맨스 스캠(Romance Scam) 범죄 현황 및 대응방안에 대한 고찰 [A Study on Romance Scam: The Current Situation and Effective Countermeasures]. The Police Science Journal, 14(3), 117–146. https://doi.org/10.16961/polips.2019.14.3.117
  15. Lee, K. F., Chan, M. Y., & Mohamad Ali, A. (2022). Self and desired partner descriptions in the online romance scam: a linguistic analysis of scammer and general user profiles on online dating portals. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 25(1), 20–46. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41300-022-00169-7
  16. Shaari, A. H., Kamaluddin, M. R., Paizi@Fauzi, W. F., & Mohd, M. (2019). Online-Dating Romance Scam in Malaysia: An Analysis of Online Conversations between Scammers and Victims. GEMA Online® Journal of Language Studies, 19(1), 97–115. https://doi.org/10.17576/gema-2019-1901-06
  17. Verma, S., Gujarathi, P., & Lazarus, S. (2026). Romance Fraud in India: A Qualitative Study of Online–Offline Transitions in the Digital Dating Ecosystem. Journal of Economic Criminology, 100248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2026.100248
  18. Whitty, M. T. (2013). Anatomy of the online dating romance scam. Security Journal, 28(4), 443–455. https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2012.57
Full synthesis and revision history

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Across the reviewed evidence, relationship‑based frauds commonly use deliberate, interactional grooming to generate interpersonal trust that is later leveraged for financial or other exploitation. Descriptive sources converge on a staged interactional pattern—initial approach on public platforms, rapid or sustained intimacy work, migration to private channels, and subsequently framed monetary or investment requests. Trust is built through frequent, tailored, emotionally attuned communication (including mirroring, personalized references, repeated affirmations of commitment, and sympathy narratives) that elicits reciprocal self‑disclosure and perceived closeness; these interactional tactics are reported in both individualized catfishing and organized pig‑butchering variants. Reports document temporal heterogeneity, including relationships lasting a week to more than a year before financial problems are raised, and recurring escalation sequences in which small test requests precede larger solicitations. Victims report combined financial and emotional harms—loss of the perceived relationship, diminished trust in others, and difficulty accepting deception. A systematic review identifies limited empirical attention to scammer–victim interactions on messaging platforms, and linguistic research calls for examining actual ongoing conversations to clarify how trust is gained. Experimental research also cautions that experiments cannot fully reproduce prolonged, evolving grooming interactions (Annadorai et al., 2020; Ashibly, 2025; Bilz et al., 2023; Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross, 2023; Griffin & Mei, 2024; Gujarathi et al., 2026; Huang & Yao, 2025; Kim & Seo, 2019; K. F. Lee et al., 2022; “The Crime of "Pig-butchering Scams" in the Securities Market and...”, 2023; Whitty, 2013).

Typical interactional sequence and temporal variability

Multiple descriptive studies and reviews describe a recurring multi‑stage sequence in relationship‑based fraud: offenders approach targets on public platforms (dating sites, social media, random messages), develop rapport and intimacy (often with early declarations of affection), move conversations into private channels (instant messaging, email, phone), and then introduce framed monetary requests that escalate from small, plausible asks to larger solicitations (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; H. Lee & Boo, 2025; Lim & Choi, 2025; Whitty, 2013).

The interval between first contact and the initial financial request varies substantially across reports. Some cases escalate within days or weeks, while investment‑oriented hybrids (often labelled pig‑butchering) commonly involve weeks to many months of sustained grooming before financial extraction, so the literature emphasizes temporal heterogeneity rather than a single typical timeline (Ashibly, 2025; Griffin & Mei, 2024; Gujarathi et al., 2026; Kim & Seo, 2019; “The Crime of "Pig-butchering Scams" in the Securities Market and...”, 2023).

Interactional mechanics: how trust is constructed

Authors report that trust is constructed through high‑volume, often daily, tailored communication that elicits reciprocal self‑disclosure and produces perceived closeness. Techniques documented include mirroring and personalization (using victim‑provided details), love‑bombing (frequent praise, declarations of commitment, projected shared futures), and use of sympathy narratives (medical, legal, or logistical crises) to create urgency and moral obligation to help (Annadorai et al., 2020; Carter, 2020; Cross, 2023; Grace Carvalho Fernandes et al., 2023; Yosiandra & Sakariah, 2024).

Linguistic and discourse analyses show repeated micro‑ and macro‑linguistic devices used to sustain an illusion of authenticity: pet names, flattering or poetic expressions, future‑oriented modal language, appeals to bonding or shared values, and tailored self‑presentation that exploits victim disclosures. Asynchronous messaging permits offenders time to craft hyperpersonal content and to adapt presentation in response to victims’ input (Annadorai et al., 2020; Dreijers & Rudziša, 2020; Shaari et al., 2019).

Secrecy and migration to private channels are frequently documented operational tactics. Moving conversations off the originating platform increases exclusivity and, in victim hindsight, was recognized as a strategy to reduce reporting and detection; offenders also withhold or withdraw communication strategically to increase anxiety and compliance (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross et al., 2018; Kassem & Carter, 2023).

Variants and organizational forms

Empirical and forensic work distinguishes individualized catfishing—single actors using fabricated profiles—from organized, worker‑mediated operations that train personnel to sustain long‑running grooming. Ethnographic and qualitative accounts document recruitment, intensive training, and role specialization in some organized pig‑butchering operations (Anderson et al., 2024; Franceschini et al., 2023; Luo & Zhao, 2025).

Pig‑butchering (romance‑to‑investment) scams are characterized by prolonged, relationship‑like digital contact in which offenders deliberately build trust and elicit compliance before requesting money. Descriptions of operational stages commonly identify (1) approach using a false identity on digital platforms, (2) sustained trust‑building through daily messages and simulated emotional reciprocity, and (3) financial extraction via investment solicitations. Case analyses include examples in which a romantic connection on a dating app later escalated into a cryptocurrency investment solicitation. In securities‑market variants, these schemes often take about six months as fraudsters construct identities and apparent professional capability to gain victims’ trust (Ashibly, 2025; Botha et al., 2025; Cross & Holt, 2025; Gujarathi et al., 2026; “The Crime of "Pig-butchering Scams" in the Securities Market and...”, 2023).

Organized operations use scripted persona techniques to build trust and rapport: scammers share fabricated photos, videos, and life stories and display care (sometimes sending expensive gifts) to develop intimate relationships, after which they recommend fake investments and steal the target’s funds (Cross, 2022; Franceschini et al., 2023; Wang & Zhou, 2022).

Victim experience, harms, and vulnerability patterns

Victim accounts and complaint‑dataset analyses consistently show that many victims form strong emotional attachments to the presented persona and that this emotional investment compounds harm: victims report both monetary loss and relational loss (grief, loss of perceived relationship), and prolonged intense offender contact can erode trust in online environments and others (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross, Richards, & Smith, 2016; Notté et al., 2021).

Studies describe small initial requests used to test victims before gradually increasing the amounts sought. In one betting-task example, offenders promptly returned an initial small payment to build confidence before directing the victim to deposit investment funds. Investment offers are also legitimized through authoritative contacts, investment applications or websites, and claimed investment expertise. When victims send money without suspicion, scammers may maintain contact and extract funds repeatedly. Reported trust-building practices include invoking claimed wealth or appearance and sustaining romantic involvement for periods ranging from about one week to more than a year before raising financial problems. Professional or military cover identities are described as apparent strategies to foster rapport and convey stability. Soldier-impersonation scripts also use military photographs to gain trust and stories of war-zone hardship and a desire to leave deployment to evoke sympathy. Together, these descriptions illustrate how early tests, staged demonstrations of reliability, and continued relationship contact can support serial financial extraction (Button et al., 2014; Kim & Seo, 2019; Luong & Ngo, 2024; Soares & Lazarus, 2024; Wang & Zhou, 2022).

Specific vulnerability indicators recur in the literature—loneliness, social isolation, and acquired brain injury are frequently reported in case and qualitative work as associated with targeting or larger harms—but these findings are descriptive or correlational and derive from purposive, complaint‑based, or clinical samples; causal inferences about susceptibility are not established in those records (Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Cross, 2016; Gould et al., 2021).

Methodological patterns, limitations, and evidence gaps

The reviewed corpus is rich in qualitative descriptions, case studies, targeted chat corpora, and systematic reviews, but many primary studies use purposive, complaint‑based, or small samples and are retrospective or platform‑bounded. These designs support robust descriptive inferences about grooming tactics and language but limit representativeness and causal attribution (Cross & Holt, 2025; Feng, 2026; Shaari et al., 2019; Whitty, 2013).

A systematic review identifies few empirical studies of scammer–victim interactions on messaging platforms. Linguistic research calls for examining actual ongoing conversations to identify further indicators of romance fraud and clarify how scammers gain trust. Other research analyzes victim-submitted reports—for example, one study collected 3,909 reports—but such reports should not be equated with recordings of ongoing conversations. A further research priority is to examine how people interpret and navigate offline encounters, given the literature’s predominantly digital focus; this recommendation does not establish the frequency, mechanisms, or outcomes of those encounters (Bilz et al., 2023; Huang & Yao, 2025; K. F. Lee et al., 2022; Verma et al., 2026).

Experimental designs provide insight into victims’ cognitive processing, but cannot fully reproduce the prolonged, evolving interactions through which offenders gradually establish trust, deepen emotional investment, and apply social pressure. Complementary approaches in the reviewed evidence include analysis of victim reports describing fabricated identities, financial crises, and affectionate language, and critical discourse analysis combined with conversation-analytic principles to examine interactions across romance, transition, finance, and post-romance sextortion stages. These approaches offer different perspectives rather than interchangeable measures of grooming (Carter, 2024; Huang & Yao, 2025).

Implications for research and practice

A concrete research priority is to examine actual ongoing scammer–victim conversations to identify linguistic indicators and clarify how offenders gain trust. This responds to the limited empirical attention to messaging-platform interactions identified in a systematic review; it does not yet establish which conversational moves predict financial transfers (Bilz et al., 2023; K. F. Lee et al., 2022).

Victim accounts illustrate the relational dimension of catfishing: a substantial number of participants in one study reported feeling love or being in love with the perpetrator, sometimes before hearing the person’s voice. A separate linguistic study analyzed thirty conversations selected from victims who had experienced all scam stages and made at least one payment; that selection limits what the sample can reveal about interactions that do not lead to payment. An educational game depicts a protagonist being progressively drawn deeper into a romance scam. Its narrative is an illustration, not an observed offender–victim interaction or evidence that the game prevents victimization (Lea et al., 2024; Ryan & Taylor, 2024; Shaari et al., 2019).

Romance fraud involves offenders exploiting relationships that victims perceive as genuine; offenders gain victims’ trust in order to manipulate them (Cross, 2019; Grace Carvalho Fernandes et al., 2023).

References

This AI-assisted synthesis is based on reviewed evidence records. It may contain errors or omissions. Follow the publication and DOI links, consult the original works, and make your own judgment about the evidence.

Revision history

  1. Version 112

    Current public version

    Incremental evidence update. A small update is sufficient. Remove the withdrawn synthetic-dialogue citations and reassess the claims they supported, particularly the presentation of scripted behavior as interactional evidence. Add the narrowly stated research priority concerning offline encounters without implying that the excerpt reports findings about those encounters. Retain the central grooming-and-trust conclusion and the existing timing account: the fuller Kim and Seo excerpt supports rela...

  2. Version 111

    Incremental evidence update. A small update is sufficient. Remove the withdrawn synthetic-dialogue citations and reassess the claims they supported, particularly the presentation of scripted behavior as interactional evidence. Add the narrowly stated research priority concerning offline encounters without implying that the excerpt reports findings about those encounters. Retain the central grooming-and-trust conclusion and the existing timing account: the fuller Kim and Seo excerpt supports rela...

  3. Version 110

    Incremental evidence update. A small update is sufficient. Remove the withdrawn synthetic-dialogue citations and reassess the claims they supported, particularly the presentation of scripted behavior as interactional evidence. Add the narrowly stated research priority concerning offline encounters without implying that the excerpt reports findings about those encounters. Retain the central grooming-and-trust conclusion and the existing timing account: the fuller Kim and Seo excerpt supports rela...

    • Publications: 41 (+1)
    • Evidence statements: 151 (+1)
    • Cited sources: 41 (+1)

    Sources added: Examining fifty cases of convicted online romance fraud offenders.

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