Different ways a relationship becomes a money request
Money requests can involve personal crises or investment offers; some documented exploitation also moves offline. In an Indian study of 35 reported cases, 25 had evidence of a physical-setting transition, while 10 remained primarily digital. These counts describe that case set, not prevalence; whether similar interactional patterns extend beyond India remains unresolved (Verma et al., 2026; Wang & Zhou, 2022; Whitty, 2013b).
| Focus | What the studies show | What remains uncertain |
|---|---|---|
| Apparent compatibility Profile comparisons and communication research | Narrower vocabulary in scammer profiles may reflect reused or formulaic descriptions. Separate research describes offenders using information gathered about targets to signal shared interests (K. F. Lee et al., 2022; Walther & Whitty, 2020). | Interpretation. Differences between profile samples do not make a particular romantic word or phrase proof that an individual is committing fraud (K. F. Lee et al., 2022). |
| Urgent personal help Qualitative scam accounts | A fabricated crisis creates pressure to pay quickly, sometimes with a threat that the relationship will end without payment (Faber, 2024; Whitty, 2013b). | The accounts do not establish a universal sequence in which every crisis follows a small preliminary request (Whitty, 2013a, 2013b). |
| An investment opportunity Case analysis and victim accounts | Apparent profits or small withdrawals provide reassurance before larger deposits and demands for additional payments to release funds (Anderson et al., 2024; Botha et al., 2025). | Interpretation. The accounts reveal how reassurance was constructed, not how much each feature independently influenced a decision to invest (Anderson et al., 2024). |
| Adaptation during contact Standardized email experiment | Respondents changed their messages as researchers varied the prospect of receiving money during the exchange (Dickinson et al., 2023). | Responding addresses were not necessarily separate offenders, and the findings may not extend to investment scams or other platforms (Dickinson et al., 2023). |
Offenders personalize contact and move conversations elsewhere
A conversation can feel personal without being spontaneous. Research describes offenders searching social-network information beyond a dating profile and incorporating the target’s interests into their stories. Accounts of relationship-based investment fraud also describe early questions about personal background and financial circumstances (Walther & Whitty, 2020; Wang & Zhou, 2022).
Interpretation. Offenders may change channels or move contact offline. A legal analysis links leaving dating sites to avoiding detection; an email experiment recorded requests to switch channels. In the Indian case study, public encounters more commonly involved financial pressure and social coercion; private encounters sometimes involved robbery, extortion, or violence. These associations do not show that setting caused harm or that public meetings eliminated risk (Dickinson et al., 2023; Gillespie, 2017; Verma et al., 2026).
A crisis can make payment a condition of staying together
Requests for small gifts sometimes appear near the end of trust-building; researchers interpret these as possible tests of willingness to comply. Scam narratives also include supposed doctors, lawyers, and law-enforcement officers. The presence of these authority figures is documented, although the cited accounts do not establish their individual effects on payment decisions (Whitty, 2013a, 2013b).
Faber’s language study examined 53 conversations between scammers and the author, collected over a two-year period from 2021 to 2023. Different scammers repeated words, phrases, and entire paragraphs. In the crisis narratives, emergencies varied with the claimed occupation, but payment became a condition for continuing the relationship (Faber, 2024).
Only 31 of those 53 conversations reached the crisis stage. The others stopped for various reasons, and the author was the sole target. This study shows how messages were constructed and how exchanges could end; it does not measure how often ordinary recipients would believe the story or send money (Faber, 2024).
Investment scams offer apparent evidence that the money is safe
Relationship-based investment fraud, often called pig-butchering, redirects trust toward a supposed financial opportunity. Research describes scammers teaching targets to use fraudulent apps, offering scammer-controlled accounts for initial transactions, or appearing to contribute money. The contact presents involvement as assistance rather than simply asking the target for personal financial help (Wang & Zhou, 2022).
In one documented cryptocurrency-investment case, an apparent winning trade nearly doubled the victim’s initial investment before further deposits were sought. When the victim later requested a withdrawal, the platform demanded a purported $1,980 tax payment, followed by a $2,880 service charge. These were successive demands within the same case, not typical charges across scams (Botha et al., 2025).
Interpretation. Other investment-fraud accounts describe displayed account balances and small initial withdrawals that helped the operation appear legitimate. The practical distinction is between seeing an apparent balance, receiving a small payment, and being able to recover the full investment. These accounts show why the first two cannot establish the third (Anderson et al., 2024; Wang & Zhou, 2022).
A script does not mean the replies are fixed
An email experiment randomly assigned 500 addresses reported as fraudulent to three groups. One hundred addresses were inactive, and 94 replied to the first message. Researchers followed those replies with standardized exchanges that varied the prospect of a reward, examining behavior during contact rather than relying solely on later recollections (Dickinson et al., 2023).
After researchers introduced money and offered to share it as a gift card, many respondents demanded that card. Requests for identifying information became uncommon as the potential reward increased. The authors interpreted these changes as evidence that offenders adjust their approach during an interaction, rather than always delivering an unchanged sequence of messages (Dickinson et al., 2023).
Responding addresses were not necessarily separate, confirmed offenders: one person could control several addresses, and some listings could be mistaken. The authors also cautioned against extending the results to contacts presenting themselves as men, cryptocurrency-romance scams, or other platforms. These limits concern the offenders studied; the experiment did not test whether ordinary recipients would believe the messages or send money (Dickinson et al., 2023).
One apparent partner may conceal several workers
Interviews conducted in 2022 and 2023 with 32 survivors of scam compounds in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos informed an account of organized operations. Workers sent fake wrong-number messages, then passed people who engaged to more capable workers. The researchers cross-checked the interviews against survivor accounts collected by nongovernmental organizations and journalists (Franceschini et al., 2023).
Interpretation. Court-judgment analysis found divided roles but mainly captured lower-level contact, money-transfer and cash-withdrawal operatives. It provided little detail about leaders. In a separate study of 50 convicted romance-fraud offenders, 80% reported learning tactics through friends; financial need was recorded as the primary motivation for all 50. Neither sample establishes population rates. These findings also do not show that financial need causes offending or that every scam has the same organization (H. Lee & Boo, 2025; Soares & Lazarus, 2024).
What education and case-review teams can change
Interpretation. Education and case-review teams can use these recommendations to revise their materials and reporting practices. They follow from documented tactics but have not been shown here to prevent losses (Dickinson et al., 2023; Wang & Zhou, 2022; Whitty, 2013b).
Explain both reasons for paying
Include both the supposed partner who needs emergency help and the supposed partner who introduces an investment. Explain how displayed account balances or small initial withdrawals can help an operation appear legitimate. Emergency-only examples leave out an important route from relationship to payment (Anderson et al., 2024; Wang & Zhou, 2022; Whitty, 2013b).
Ask about the sequence, not just the profile
In case reviews, ask what information the contact sought, when money entered the conversation, and how requests changed after hesitation or refusal. Record smaller replacement demands as well as escalating ones. Also ask whether contact moved into physical meetings and what pressure occurred there. The Indian cases justify including that question, not assuming their patterns apply elsewhere (Verma et al., 2026; Wang & Zhou, 2022; Whitty, 2013a).
Leave room for pressure after discovery
Allow follow-up reports to capture renewed love claims, supposed police involvement, aggression, or blackmail. Some documented scams continued after disclosure, while other participants described abuse when they questioned the story or refused payment. Recognition should not be treated as proof that contact or exploitation has ended (Cross, 2018; Whitty, 2013a).
Does the material represent the research accurately?
Before adopting awareness material or a case-review checklist, ask who was studied, where, and what happened. A single investment case illustrates payment demands; conversations with one researcher reveal how messages were constructed. Neither establishes how often ordinary recipients would pay. Likewise, the Indian case findings warrant attention to offline harm without establishing that the same interactional patterns occur elsewhere (Botha et al., 2025; Faber, 2024; Verma et al., 2026).
About the evidence
This explanation draws on selected sources from RSRC’s full synthesis. The full research record, its source list and version history remain available below.
Explore this topic’s methods and groups studied · Follow topic updates
Scope, preparation and limitations
Codex edited and reviewed this explanation from synthesis version 103. Changed passages were checked against preserved source excerpts; passing source checks were reused for unchanged passages. The editorial judgments are recorded as Codex review, not a new API grading run. They assess communication, not reader-test results or scientific certainty. No human or expert content review of this explanation is recorded.
The full synthesis preserves 34 publication records and 317 evidence statements. These counts do not establish the number of independent studies or the strength of a finding. Practical implications are editorial interpretations, with limitations explained alongside the evidence.
RSRC methodologySources cited in this explanation (15)
Links open the publication record or original work. Journal access may vary.
- Anderson, M., March, E., Land, L., & Boshuijzen-van Burken, C. (2024). Exploring the roles played by trust and technology in the online investment fraud victimisation process. Journal of Criminology, 57(4), 488–514. https://doi.org/10.1177/26338076241248176
- Botha, J. G., Singh, K., & Leenen, L. (2025). Analysis of a Cryptocurrency Investment Scam: Pig Butchering. European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, 24(1), 61–70. https://doi.org/10.34190/eccws.24.1.3558
- Cross, C. (2018). (Mis)Understanding the Impact of Online Fraud: Implications for Victim Assistance Schemes. Victims & Offenders, 13(6), 757–776. https://doi.org/10.1080/15564886.2018.1474154
- Dickinson, T., Wang, F., & Maimon, D. (2023). What Money Can Do: Examining the Effects of Rewards on Online Romance Fraudsters’ Deceptive Strategies. Deviant Behavior, 44(9), 1386–1400. https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2023.2197547
- Faber, P. (2024). The Frames of Romance Scamming. Research in Language, 22(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.18778/1731-7533.22.1.01
- Franceschini, I., Li, L., & Bo, M. (2023). Compound Capitalism: A Political Economy of Southeast Asia’s Online Scam Operations. Critical Asian Studies, 55(4), 575–603. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2023.2268104
- Gillespie, A. A. (2017). The Electronic Spanish Prisoner. The Journal of Criminal Law, 81(3), 217–231. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022018317702803
- Lee, H., & Boo, M. (2025). Analyzing the Evolving Modus Operandi of Romance Scams via Court Judgments: Crime Script and Policy Implications. KOREAN CRIMINOLOGICAL REVIEW, 36(4), 131–166. https://doi.org/10.36889/kcr.2025.12.31.4.131
- Lee, K. F., Chan, M. Y., & Mohamad Ali, A. (2022). Self and desired partner descriptions in the online romance scam: a linguistic analysis of scammer and general user profiles on online dating portals. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 25(1), 20–46. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41300-022-00169-7
- Soares, A. B., & Lazarus, S. (2024). Examining fifty cases of convicted online romance fraud offenders. Criminal Justice Studies, 37(4), 328–351. https://doi.org/10.1080/1478601x.2024.2429088
- Verma, S., Gujarathi, P., & Lazarus, S. (2026). Romance Fraud in India: A Qualitative Study of Online–Offline Transitions in the Digital Dating Ecosystem. Journal of Economic Criminology, 100248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2026.100248
- Walther, J. B., & Whitty, M. T. (2020). Language, Psychology, and New New Media: The Hyperpersonal Model of Mediated Communication at Twenty-Five Years. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 40(1), 120–135. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927x20967703
- Wang, F., & Zhou, X. (2022). Persuasive Schemes for Financial Exploitation in Online Romance Scam: An Anatomy on Sha Zhu Pan (杀猪盘) in China. Victims & Offenders, 18(5), 915–942. https://doi.org/10.1080/15564886.2022.2051109
- Whitty, M. T. (2013a). Anatomy of the online dating romance scam. Security Journal, 28(4), 443–455. https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2012.57
- Whitty, M. T. (2013b). The Scammers Persuasive Techniques Model: Development of a Stage Model to Explain the Online Dating Romance Scam. British Journal of Criminology, 53(4), 665–684. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azt009
Full synthesis and revision history
Download the full synthesis PDF
Across the reviewed evidence, relationship‑based online frauds—including classic romance scams, catfishing, and hybrid investment variants often labeled pig‑butchering—operate as staged social‑engineering sequences. These sequences typically begin with a deceptive profile and initial contact, proceed through grooming and rapport building using personalized and often formulaic messaging, include small compliance tests or information probes, and culminate in escalating monetary or data extraction accompanied by tactics to frustrate recovery or detection. Multiple independent empirical, linguistic, experimental, offender‑perspective, and forensic studies document recurring elements in this staged progression and document distinct variant paths (for example, direct crisis requests versus investment‑platform inducements). An Indian case study also documents transitions from digitally initiated relationships to physical encounters involving financial pressure, coercion, and sometimes violence; whether similar interactional patterns occur beyond India remains a question for comparative research. Methodologically, the literature combines victim and complaint corpora, small qualitative interviews, offender ethnographies and interviews, experimental live‑interaction work, discourse and corpus analyses, court‑judgment coding, and blockchain forensics; each method contributes different evidence about specific stages or tactics and also carries specific limitations that affect generalizability and inference (Abubakari, 2024; Bilz et al., 2023; Dickinson & Wang, 2023; Dickinson, Wang, & Maimon, 2023; Dreijers & Rudziša, 2020; Faber, 2024; Franceschini et al., 2023; Parti et al., 2026; Stern & Choi, 2026; Verma et al., 2026; Wang & Topalli, 2024; Wang & Zhou, 2022; Whitty, 2013a).
Reproducible staged progression of attacks
Multiple empirical and analytic studies converge on a multi‑stage progression used by many relationship‑based scammers: (1) creation of a deceptive profile and initial contact, (2) grooming and rapport building through personalized interaction, (3) small initial requests or information probes to test compliance, and (4) escalation to monetary requests or staged investment propositions that culminate in extraction and possible re‑targeting or recovery fraud (Dickinson, Wang, & Maimon, 2023; Dreijers & Rudziša, 2020; Wang & Zhou, 2022; Whitty, 2013a).
Classic stage models and corpus/discourse analyses place explicit monetary requests toward later correspondence stages, and experimental live‑interaction work shows offenders adapt strategies responsively as perceived reward or target behavior changes—supporting a dynamic, feedback‑sensitive sequence rather than a single rigid script (Dickinson, Wang, & Maimon, 2023; Dreijers & Rudziša, 2020; Wang & Dickinson, 2024).
Profile construction and initial approach
Scammer profiles often reuse formulaic narrative material in the free‑text, self‑description sections of dating or social profiles. Corpus analyses that compare identified scammer narratives with general user profiles find a narrower vocabulary range and higher keyness for personal‑attribute adjectives (for example, ‘‘honest’’ and ‘‘loving’’), consistent with repeated or templated wording rather than fully idiosyncratic presentation. Case‑based reconstructions additionally report impersonated social‑network accounts used to approach and identify targets and preparatory actions such as searching for targets and drafting scenario scripts. These findings describe patterns in analyzed profile narratives and reconstructed case documents, not a complete taxonomy of all profile‑features or demonstrated causal effects of any single profile element on victim selection (Kim & Seo, 2019; K. F. Lee et al., 2022).
Empirical studies report that most romance‑fraud campaigns initiate on dating or social‑networking sites and that offenders commonly attempt to move correspondence off the hosting platform to encrypted or private channels (for example, WhatsApp or private messaging) to reinforce exclusivity and reduce platform detection (Cross, 2018; Dickinson, Wang, & Maimon, 2023; Gillespie, 2017; Walther & Whitty, 2020).
Verified‑profile experiments and comparative corpus work examined static profile features by directly comparing known scammer profiles with verified genuine profiles. One corpus‑based study compared 500 user profiles identified as having fraudulent characteristics with 500 user profiles downloaded from five popular dating portals. A separate experimental study used 20 verified scammer profiles and 20 known real profiles matched on gender and age (K. F. Lee et al., 2022; Whitty, 2019).
Grooming mechanics and persuasive tactics
Grooming routinely uses personalized attention, exaggerated romantic language (love‑bombing), and narratives invoking sympathy or shared identity. Corpus and qualitative studies document repeated scripted language, time pressure, manufactured crises (medical bills, travel or customs problems), and appeals to purported authorities to legitimize requests (Annadorai et al., 2020; Faber, 2024; Walther & Whitty, 2020; Wang & Topalli, 2022; Whitty, 2013b).
Reported cases describe emotionally engaging communication used to establish credibility before financial or coercive exploitation, while another account describes affectionate language and sympathy-based financial requests. Comparative analysis distinguishes fabricated urgent scenarios involving direct money requests from investment-focused schemes. In a study of fraudsters’ email responses, all participants at some point urged continued correspondence or faster responses, and researchers found that fraudsters altered their behavior repeatedly as potential reward, represented by victim behavior, fluctuated. Script completion also varied: in another study, 31 of 53 fraudsters reached the crisis stage and completed the script, while 22 did not. These findings document recurring persuasive devices and adaptive behavior in the studied interactions rather than a single invariant sequence (Abidin et al., 2018; Dickinson, Wang, & Maimon, 2023; Faber, 2024; Verma et al., 2026; Wang & Zhou, 2022).
Escalation, compliance testing, and extraction mechanics
Tactical escalation commonly follows a foot‑in‑the‑door pattern: small early requests or informational probes (for example, photographs or minor gifts) serve as compliance tests and precede larger financial demands. Message‑corpus analyses and victim‑report studies show that explicit money demands tend to appear after rapport has been established or after a reward cue, and repeated or additional money requests are a frequent trigger for victims to recognize fraud (Cross, 2023; Dickinson, Wang, & Maimon, 2023; Dreijers & Rudziša, 2020).
In investment‑focused variants, offenders sometimes stage early apparent profits and permit small test withdrawals to build confidence prior to inducing larger deposits; withdrawal attempts are then blocked or delayed with successive fee or tax pretexts that extract further funds or prevent recovery (Anderson et al., 2024; Botha et al., 2025).
Pig‑butchering and hybrid investment variants
A hybrid pathway documented in several studies redirects relationship‑building into fabricated investment or trading platforms. Analyses characterize this variant as involving distinct phases—initial contact and hunting, nurturing or fattening through longer‑term grooming and staged small gains, and a harvesting phase that steers victims into fraudulent trading or gambling apps. These studies report that offenders teach targets to use fake platforms and that investment‑framing differentiates some regional variants from forms that rely mainly on direct urgent money requests; the description reflects reported case material and comparative interpretation rather than a claim that every romance fraud follows this path (Wang & Zhou, 2022).
Escalation, compliance testing, and extraction mechanics (investment variants)
For investment‑focused variants documented in forensic and case analyses, researchers report operational patterns in which apparent early profits or successful small trades are displayed to build victim confidence and permit small test withdrawals; following encouragement to invest larger sums, withdrawal attempts are often met with additional fee or tax pretexts in the reported cases. Blockchain‑forensics case studies also identify recurring transaction patterns in traced address networks (for example, short relay paths and rapid pass‑through behavior at intermediary addresses) and use thematic analysis to describe aggregation and redistribution patterns in some traced networks. These findings derive from specific case analyses and forensic tracing and should be interpreted as documented operational patterns in those studies rather than as proven, universal mechanics across all investment‑framed romance fraud (Botha et al., 2025; Parti et al., 2026; Stern & Choi, 2026).
Organizational forms, offender perspectives, and role differentiation
Evidence from offender and survivor accounts and transaction‑architecture analyses documents that relationship‑based scams commonly involve organized, specialized syndicate structures and staged operational chains. Recruited individuals are assigned to distinct groups responsible for victim communication, personal‑data resources, IT/telecom support, and money laundering, and operations typically follow sequential stages: organizational formation, organizational operation, target selection and relationship building, fund solicitation and extraction, transfer of victim funds, distribution of proceeds, and evasion of investigation. Survivor interviews from scam compounds in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos corroborate accounts of recruitment, division of labor, and staged operations, and thematic blockchain‑forensics analysis of financial flows has identified recurring patterns such as aggregation, redistribution, layering, balance retention, mining‑pool exposure, and internal connectivity. Additionally, offenders use multiple communication channels to increase perceived legitimacy and reinforce victim trust and compliance (Cross, 2018; Franceschini et al., 2023; H. Lee & Boo, 2025; Stern & Choi, 2026; Wang & Zhou, 2022).
Offender‑perspective studies also note socialization and neutralization mechanisms that facilitate entry and persistence: peer training, economic pressures, rationalizations (game, livelihood, or restitution narratives), and organized recruitment channels. Several offender‑focused empirical studies caution about generalizability because samples are purposive and often hotspot‑based, but they nonetheless document patterns of specialization and sometimes coercive labor recruitment in large compound operations. In a study of 50 convicted online romance-fraud offenders, 80% reported learning tactics through friends, and financial need was recorded as the primary motivation for all 50. These findings describe the studied offenders, not population rates or evidence that financial need causes offending (Franceschini et al., 2024; Han, 2026; Luo & Zhao, 2025; Soares & Lazarus, 2024; Toku & Otu Offei, 2023).
Methodological patterns, limitations, evidence gaps, and future directions
Research has employed survivor interviews, systematic review, and blockchain transaction analysis. A review identified common scammer profile features and techniques, countermeasures, and factors associated with becoming a scammer or a victim. One study used 32 in-depth interviews with survivors of scam compounds in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos. Another analyzed the internal transaction structure of 29 sanctioned Bitcoin addresses linked to the Prince Group and Chen Zhi. One finding across studies is that requests for money typically appear near the end of romance scams (Bilz et al., 2023; Dreijers & Rudziša, 2020; Franceschini et al., 2023; Parti et al., 2026).
Authors explicitly identify several priority evidence gaps and research directions reflected in the reviewed records: underrepresentation of fraudster‑derived investigation of offender strategies and motivations; investigation of scammers’ behavioral patterns, including risk‑avoidance strategies; limited knowledge of how pig‑butchering scams persuade and how those conversations unfold; use of experimental dependent measures that capture fraudsters’ personal identity claims, requests to move channels, victim‑identity manipulation, relationship framing, follow‑up, and message length; and the need to directly interview fraudsters about their incentives and to compare those interview findings with experimental results. Research on romance fraud in India also identifies limited attention to how digitally initiated interactions translate into offline harm and cautions against treating online and offline environments as analytically separate. Comparative research is needed to assess whether the reported interactional patterns extend beyond India (Dickinson, Wang, & Maimon, 2023; Dove, 2024; Soares & Lazarus, 2024; Verma et al., 2026; Wang & Dickinson, 2024; Wang & Zhou, 2022).
Different research methods document distinct kinds of evidence. Small, in-depth qualitative or forensic studies can reveal operational detail of scams, as shown by interviews with 32 scam-compound survivors and calls for more linguistic analysis of fraud cases. Experimental or corpus-based studies can test specific mechanisms, as when dependent measures captured fraudsters’ strategies such as identity claims, requests to move channels, relationship framing, follow-up, and message length. Blockchain-forensics analyses can identify recurring behavioral patterns (for example, aggregation, redistribution, layering, balance retention, mining-pool exposure, and internal connectivity) (Faber, 2024; Franceschini et al., 2023; Stern & Choi, 2026; Wang & Dickinson, 2024).
Online-to-offline transitions and setting-specific harm
Digitally initiated romance fraud can extend into physical encounters rather than remaining an online payment scheme. In an Indian study of 35 reported cases, 25 contained sufficient evidence of a transition into a physical setting; 10 remained primarily digital, including online extortion, sextortion, and fraudulent investment or payment schemes. Within the cases that transitioned offline, public encounters more commonly involved immediate financial pressure and social coercion. Private encounters offered greater control over the interaction and were sometimes associated with robbery, extortion, or physical violence. These are patterns within the reported case set, not prevalence estimates or proof that the setting caused the harm. Public meetings therefore should not be interpreted as eliminating risk. The authors call for comparative research to establish whether similar interactional patterns occur beyond India (Verma et al., 2026).
References
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- Verma, S., Gujarathi, P., & Lazarus, S. (2026). Romance Fraud in India: A Qualitative Study of Online–Offline Transitions in the Digital Dating Ecosystem. Journal of Economic Criminology, 100248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2026.100248 Publication record
- Walther, J. B., & Whitty, M. T. (2020). Language, Psychology, and New New Media: The Hyperpersonal Model of Mediated Communication at Twenty-Five Years. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 40(1), 120–135. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927x20967703 Publication record
- Wang, F., & Dickinson, T. (2024). Hyperpersonal feedback and online romance fraud: an empirical examination. Journal of Crime and Justice, 48(3), 371–389. https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648x.2024.2376700 Publication record
- Wang, F., & Topalli, V. (2022). Understanding Romance Scammers Through the Lens of Their Victims: Qualitative Modeling of Risk and Protective Factors in the Online Context. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 49(1), 145–181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-022-09706-4 Publication record
- Wang, F., & Topalli, V. (2024). The cyber-industrialization of catfishing and romance fraud. Computers in Human Behavior, 154, 108133. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2023.108133 Publication record
- Wang, F., & Zhou, X. (2022). Persuasive Schemes for Financial Exploitation in Online Romance Scam: An Anatomy on Sha Zhu Pan (杀猪盘) in China. Victims & Offenders, 18(5), 915–942. https://doi.org/10.1080/15564886.2022.2051109 Publication record
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This AI-assisted synthesis is based on reviewed evidence records. It may contain errors or omissions. Follow the publication and DOI links, consult the original works, and make your own judgment about the evidence.
Revision history
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Version 103
Current public versionIncremental evidence update. A targeted update should add the documented online-to-offline pathway without presenting it as typical of all romance fraud. In the Indian case set, 25 of 35 cases had sufficient evidence of a physical-setting transition; public and private encounters involved different reported forms of pressure or harm. These findings extend the payment-centered account but do not overturn the staged social-engineering synthesis. Preserve the case-based, reported nature of the evid...
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Version 102
Incremental evidence update. A targeted update should add the documented online-to-offline pathway without presenting it as typical of all romance fraud. In the Indian case set, 25 of 35 cases had sufficient evidence of a physical-setting transition; public and private encounters involved different reported forms of pressure or harm. These findings extend the payment-centered account but do not overturn the staged social-engineering synthesis. Preserve the case-based, reported nature of the evid...
- Publications: 34 (+2)
- Evidence statements: 317 (+15)
- Cited sources: 34 (+2)
Sources added: A Study on Romance Scam: The Current Situation and Effective Countermeasures; Knowledge and Protective Practice Towards Love Scam Among Female Facebook Users in Malaysia.
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Version 101
Incremental evidence update. A targeted update should add the documented online-to-offline pathway without presenting it as typical of all romance fraud. In the Indian case set, 25 of 35 cases had sufficient evidence of a physical-setting transition; public and private encounters involved different reported forms of pressure or harm. These findings extend the payment-centered account but do not overturn the staged social-engineering synthesis. Preserve the case-based, reported nature of the evid...
- Publications: 32 (+2)
- Evidence statements: 302 (+10)
- Cited sources: 32 (+2)
Sources added: Examining fifty cases of convicted online romance fraud offenders; Romance Fraud in India: A Qualitative Study of Online–Offline Transitions in the Digital Dating Ecosystem.
The approved evidence set changed while the cited-source list remained the same.
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